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█ Abstract In this article I argue that (1) introspective self-consciousness is an activity of narrative re-
appropriation of the products of the cognitive unconscious; and (2) this activity has an essentially self-
defensive character, being ruled by the primary and universal need to construct and protect a subjective 
identity whose solidity is the ground of the intrapsychic and interpersonal balances of human organism. 
Finally, in this framework firmly based on psychological sciences, I reconsider John Locke’s link between 
responsibility and self-consciousness. 
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█ Riassunto Inconscio, autocoscienza e responsabilità – In questo articolo sostengo che (1) l’autocoscienza 
introspettiva è un’attività di riappropriazione narrativa dei prodotti dell’inconscio cognitivo; e (2) questa 
attività ha una natura essenzialmente difensiva, essendo governata dal bisogno universale e primario di 
costruire e proteggere un’identità soggettiva la cui solidità è il fondamento degli equilibri intrapsichici e 
interpersonali dell’organismo umano. Infine, in questo quadro saldamente fondato sui dati delle scienze 
cognitive, riconsidero il nesso istituito da John Locke fra responsabilità e autocoscienza. 
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█ Locke on self-consciousness and 
  responsibility 
 
According to Locke, the concept of per-
son does not refer to an essence but rather to 
a psychosocial attribute that is assigned to 
those subjects who possess a specific set of 
psychological capacities.1 This is in agree-
ment with the most common legal language, 
which suitably talks about “natural persons” 
and similarly about “legal persons”, thus 
pointing out something precise, i.e., the pre-
sence of an agent or subject who, in virtue of 
one’s intrinsic characteristics, is fully able to 
perform such acts as buying a real estate, 
making a donation or a will, or paying taxes.  
Here the acting subject is a person pre-
cisely to the extent that she can be held (ethi-
cally even before legally) responsible for what 
she does. So she is imputable as well: if she 
committed a crime, she knew very well what 
she was doing. The concept of person there-
Studi 
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fore rests on that of personal responsibility; 
and it is easy to see, even intuitively, that the 
concept of responsibility rests on the concept 
of consciousness, or better self-conscious-
ness, seen precisely as awareness of one’s own 
acts, and hence as critical appropriation of 
one’s own projects, actions, and memories. 
An individual can make a will only if she is a 
person – and indeed a child cannot make a 
will, not even an old man who suffers from 
arteriosclerosis and dementia; they are not 
sufficiently responsible inasmuch as they are 
not sufficiently aware of the meaning, scope, 
and consequences of their actions. 
Thus, as already mentioned, the Lockean 
person is someone who owns a collection of 
psychological capacities. It is someone who is 
able to form imaginary test scenarios to make 
a planning evaluation of what can happen as 
a consequence of his actions. But above all it 
is someone who is able to grasp himself not 
only as a material agent in his own present, 
past and future acts as “public” acts, but also 
as an entity who has an interiority, i.e., an in-
ner virtual space in which thoughts and af-
fects as “private” events can be situated. Only 
someone who has enough access to one’s in-
teriority (to oneself as objectified in the in-
trospective consciousness of the self) can ap-
propriate «Actions and their Merits».2 
In Locke, therefore, an individual is a per-
son only insomuch as she can reflectively ap-
propriate her actions and their meaning – an 
appropriation that originates from «that 
consciousness which is inseparable from 
thinking».3 Locke also realizes that this very 
awareness is the ground of the sense of iden-
tity. What is really new in this philosopher is 
that for the first time consciousness is a  
“secular” notion; it is not an innate sub-
stance, and above all it breaks with the soul: 
«So that self is not determined by identity or 
diversity of substance, which it cannot be 
sure of, but only by identity of conscious-
ness», he writes.4 But if the person is deter-
mined by consciousness, by what is con-
sciousness determined? 
Locke relies on consciousness as the most 
psychological and less metaphysical notion 
he can conceive to define the concepts of 
person and identity. On closer view, ho-
wever, this consciousness is a “strong” stand-
in for the soul; actually it is still a sort of secu-
larized soul. Despite the philosopher’s good 
intentions, it is described as a sort of essence. 
For all that, Locke’s consciousness is still  
given a priori.  
A different kind of consciousness can be 
found in psychological sciences: something 
that is constructed during life, that emerges 
from the multifarious qualities of the body 
and of human existence. And it is from this 
standpoint that now I will reconsider Locke’s 
link between responsibility and self-con-
sciousness.  
 
█ The Freudian Unconscious 
 
Freud’s originality does not consist in the 
discovery of the unconscious: the terms 
“subconscious” and “unconscious” were al-
ready in currency in the last decades of the 
19th century, introduced to explain phe-
nomena (e.g., convulsive “great” hysteria, 
dissociative fugue or multiple personality 
disorder) that could hardly be reconciled 
with the Cartesian consciousness-dependent 
conception of mind that was shaping the ear-
ly experimental psychology.5 Rather Freud’s 
originality consists in developing the concept 
of unconscious in two particular directions. 
In the first place, Freud puts forward the 
idea of a sexuality of the unconscious. At the 
heart of the unconscious there are “energies”, 
“forces” that Freud calls Triebe (instinctual 
drives) – first and foremost, the sexual in-
stinctual drive, or libido. In a cultural-
historical perspective, the idea of a sexuality 
of the unconscious is an important step in a 
materialist and pessimistic process of revi-
sion of the anthropological model of the 19th 
century middle class ethics – a model that 
rested on the assumption of a full responsi-
bility of the individuals towards an inner life 
made  of  conscious  and  self-transparent  in-
tentions.  
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Such a revision was fostered, on the one 
hand, by the Darwinian naturalism and the 
medical biologism of the 19th century; on the 
other, by an anthropology of “the crisis of 
Reason” which, originated from Romanti-
cism and the sceptical thought of the past 
centuries (above all Hume’s), had found its 
main theorists in Schopenhauer and Niet-
zsche. However, Freud strove hard to con-
tain the most disruptive aspects of the crisis 
of the traditional image of human rationality, 
by proposing a version of it in which, though 
in the context of a non-optimistic conception 
of human nature, he suggested that neurotic 
suffering is connected to a bad administra-
tion of the relationships with the uncon-
scious, one that resulted in wrong forms of 
self-repression. In this perspective, the      
psychoanalytic therapy offered the attractive 
perspective of a better managing of the rela-
tionships between the unconscious and con-
sciousness, encouraging in the conscious part 
of the ego the capacity to govern one’s rela-
tionships with the unconscious in a more 
conscious and rational manner.6 
In a scientific perspective, however, the 
conceptualization of sexuality in terms of in-
stinctual drives is definitely the most time-
worn part of Freud’s work. (And it is not a 
minor shortcoming since the bioenergetic 
model of the mind is the main doctrinaire 
premise of Freud’s psychoanalysis.) The de-
bate on the concept of instinct with its varia-
tions (tropisms, reflexes, drives etc.) goes 
with all the history of psychology. Attacked 
already since the 1920s, the idea of instinct as 
a definite quantity of energy that “discharges 
itself” (according to Lorenz’s famous drive-
discharge or “hydraulic” model of instinctual 
motivation) waned in the 1950s both on the 
biological front, by virtue of the study of be-
havior in terms of signals due to the British 
school of ethology,7 and on the experimental 
front, at first in relation to the development 
of the studies on the mechanisms of learning, 
and then for the appearance on the scene of 
information theory (with cybernetics and 
systems theories, and later with computer 
science). Since the 1960s, with the rise of 
cognitivism, the psychological functions (a 
concept that Freud did not possess) are de-
fined in terms of signals and information. 
But also in the psychoanalytic field, already 
in Michael Balint, in the 1930s and 1940s, we 
find an implicit crisis of the centrality of in-
stinctual drive in the theory of object rela-
tions.  
According to this trend in psychoanalysis, 
the quest for the “object” is not secondary to 
the need to discharge the libidinal drive, it is 
primary; this drastically downsizes the role of 
instinct as energy. The criticism of the con-
cept of instinctual drive becomes explicit 
with John Bowlby’s theory of attachment. Fi- 
nally, the most systematic and radical attack 
against Freud’s idea of instinct is launched in 
the United States, in the framework of the 
influence of David Rapaport’s school. Since 
the 1980s the idea that Freud’s theory of in-
stinctual drives can no longer be defended in 
light of scientific findings has become a re-
curring theme in the psychoanalytic debate.8 
The second main feature of the Freudian 
concept of the unconscious is that “unbeara-
ble” mental contents are unconscious in that 
repressed, viz. actively excluded from aware-
ness owing to the unconscious activating of 
defensive mechanisms. This concept, too, is 
timeworn. For it has now become clear that 
the phenomenon that Freud called 
“Verdrängung” – totally removing or cancel-
ling the memory of a traumatic event (proto-
typically, an episode of sexual molestation in 
infancy) from our conscious minds (and irre-
versibly, unless making appeal to specific 
techniques like hypnosis or psychoanalytic 
theory) –, if it even exists, is extremely rare. 
In addition, there is no experimental evi-
dence that such a phenomenon is in itself suf-
ficient to produce long-lasting negative ef-
fects on an individual’s mental stability.9 
After Freud, however, a weaker sense of 
“repression” established itself, even at a 
commonsense level. This is a meaning that 
we find in quite usual sentences like, for ex-
ample, “I remembered the date only when it 
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was already too late”. If someone said, as now 
it is very common to say, that I “repressed” 
the recollection of that date, what he would 
mean to say is not that I cancelled the date 
from memory but rather that I have tempo-
rarily put it aside (in an interested manner: I 
did not want to remember).  
This weaker sense of repression is highly 
relevant to the extent that it is consistent 
with a view of consciousness that is different 
from Freud’s. On his view, on the one side 
there is consciousness (well separated from 
the unconscious), on the other, the “stum-
bles” of consciousness (caused by the uncon-
scious’s infiltrating into consciousness). Such 
stumbles occurred only in a few exceptional 
or anomalous cases like, precisely, repres-
sions (in the strong sense).10 But today we  
realize, thus deepening and confirming 
Freud’s idea but also making it more radical, 
that our consciousness is globally permeated 
by the unconscious, viz. by a multitude of de-
fensive strategies that are very akin to repres-
sions (in the weak sense).11 
It can be maintained, therefore, that if, in 
one respect, the Freudian concept of repres-
sion is a museum piece, in another, it in-
cludes a reference to a still living matter, that 
of bad faith: our mental processes are per-
meated by «a self-apologetic defensiveness 
or rather, a systematic tendency towards self-
deception within our everyday thought pro-
cesses».12 This critical theme – the tendency 
of the mind to forge self-serving illusions – is 
the “strength” of Freud’s concept of the un-
conscious. 
Freud’s hypothesis is then that our con-
sciousness somehow deceives us by providing 
us with illusory immediate beliefs about our-
selves. In other words, the consciousness of 
self flatters us with the quite apparent 
presentation of qualities that are additional 
to the reality of the way in which the mind 
works. First and foremost, there is a mis-
match between the composite, non-
monadical character of the mind and its uni-
tary phenomenology. In the Ichgefühl, Freud 
writes, the ego «appears to us as something 
autonomous and unitary, marked off          
distinctly from everything else».13 But this 
appearance is deceptive: as a matter of fact 
the ego is heterogeneous, heteronomous and 
secondary.  In fact, it is the organized part of 
the id, which is totally unconscious and       
unstructured pulsionality, with which the ego 
is in continuity without any sharp delimita-
tion and for which it serves as a kind of «fa-
çade».14Accordingly, the ego is both the or-
ganization of the psyche (i.e., the partial 
structuration of the disparate functions of 
the mind) and the apparatus that has, among 
its various tasks, that of setting up a complex 
self-deception, viz. the narration of the self as 
an imaginary entity which is primary, uni-
tary, free, rational, master of the person. 
Freud’s systematic doubt about the tradi-
tional   claims   of   self-legitimation   of   con-
sciousness opens a crack in self-con-
sciousness; a crack that – as we will now see 
– becomes a ruinous landslide in psychologi-
cal sciences. 
 
█ The Cognitive Unconscious 
 
As I just said, the critical theme of bad 
faith is the strength of Freud’s concept of the 
unconscious. By contrast, the relationship be-
tween consciousness and the unconscious, as 
this unfolds in Freud’s theory of repression, is 
the clue of the main difference between the 
psychoanalytic unconscious and the uncon-
scious and subpersonal processes posited by 
cognitive scientists.  
Today Freud’s view of the relations be-
tween conscious and unconscious mind is the 
ground of the conception of consciousness 
dominant in the folk culture about the mind 
– actually it could be said that the latter is a 
largely psychoanalytic culture.15 And of 
course, this culture represents an advance on 
the Cartesian thesis of the transparency of 
the mind, which informs the image of human 
beings typical of 19th Century middle class 
ethics, which was challenged by Freud.  
If the Victorian anthropology was domi-
nated by the idea of consciousness (and con-
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scious agency) so that a person could say “If I 
did it, it is evidently because I chose it, be-
cause I wanted to do it”, in the folk psycho-
analytic culture of the mind one realizes that 
people are tossed about by instances which 
they do not always control very well, so that 
sometimes anyone can legitimately say “I did 
it but I hardly know why”, thus implying that 
one is at least somewhat at the mercy of one’s 
own psychological world.16 
Thus the folk psychoanalytic culture of 
the mind makes an important correction to 
the idea of a psyche consisting in conscious 
and self-transparent intentions; but it is only 
a partial correction. In this culture holds 
what is the most evident limitation of Freud’s 
view of the unconscious: his definition of the 
unconscious is still given by its difference 
from – and in some respects also dependence 
upon – the definition of consciousness; the 
latter is taken as a self-evident, primary da-
tum, although it is then criticized and dimi-
nished in comparison with the traditional 
view.17  
As a result, the Freudian unconscious 
comes to be just an enlargement, or exten-
sion, of a psychology – folk psychology – 
hinged on the idea of a person who is able to 
have conscious mental experiences. As 
Laplanche and Pontalis noticed, in Freud’s 
second topography the model is no longer 
one borrowed from the physical sciences as it 
was in the case of first topographical concep-
tualisation of the psychical apparatus:  
 
but is instead shot through with anthro-
pomorphism: the intrasubjective field 
tends to be conceived of after the fashion 
of intersubjective relations, and the       
systems are pictured as relatively au-
tonomous persons-within-the-person (the 
super-ego, for instance, is said to behave 
in a sadistic way towards the ego). To this 
extent then, the scientific theory of the 
psychical apparatus tends to resemble the 
way the subject comprehends and perhaps 
even constructs himself in his phantasy-
life.18 
In brief, psychoanalysis  turns  out to  be a 
personal psychology that is masked as subper-
sonal psychology. 
A response to this difficulty of psychoa-
nalysis will consist in opposing to the Freudi-
an unconscious the “new unconscious” that 
has emerged from a variety of disciplines that 
are broadly part of cognitive science.19 This is 
a level of analysis that aspires to be genuinely 
subpersonal: the information-processing  
level, wedged between the personal sphere of 
phenomenology and the subpersonal domain 
of neurobiological events. Such level no  
longer takes consciousness as an unque-
stionable assumption, as a non-negotiable 
given fact; the concept of cognitive uncon-
scious is no longer patterned, as in Freud,  
after the concept of conscious mind.  
Rather cognitive science’s subpersonal 
processes show different features from those 
of consciousness: whereas the latter seems to 
be unitary, serial, language-like, and re-
ceptive to global properties, the former are 
multiple, parallel, non-linguistic, and orien-
ted to the processing of local properties.  
This claim is to be calibrated bearing in 
mind that in some cases also the cognitive-
science unconscious processes are a little too 
akin to the idea that is intuitive to the folk – 
some cognitive-science models, and specifi-
cally Jerry Fodor’s computational-represen-
tational theory of mind, tend to reproduce 
the operation of the conscious thought pro-
cesses. So, for example, Fodor’s theory as-
sumes that there are symbols with content; or 
that there is a computational state in corre-
spondence to each folk state of belief; or still 
that cognitive processes (including the per-
ceptual ones) can be assimilated to deductive 
chains. On the whole, however, it can be af-
firmed that, because of the very way of con-
ceiving the mind in cognitive science as 
something halfway between the person and 
the brain, the cognitive unconscious does not 
faithfully reflect the conscious level; and that 
the models of the unconscious more adhering 
to the structure of awareness are likely to be-
long more to the past of  cognitive  sciences 
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than to their present.20 
 
█ A bottom-up approach to  
 self-consciousness 
 
Cognitive sciences, therefore, challenge 
the traditional nexus between consciousness 
and intentionality, thus opening a conceptual 
space in which to build a theory of the “non-
derived” unconscious, viz. a theory that no 
longer arrives at the unconscious by subtrac-
tion from consciousness. In Dennett’s terms, 
first one develops a theory of intentionality 
that is independent of and more fundamental 
than consciousness, a theory that makes no 
distinction between the various forms of un-
conscious representational mentality.21 Then, 
one proceeds to work out a theory of con-
sciousness on that foundation. In this per-
spective, consciousness is an advanced or de-
rived mental phenomenon and not, as Des-
cartes would have it, the foundation of every-
thing mental. In short, first intentionality, 
then consciousness.22 
Viewing consciousness no longer as some-
thing that explains, but rather as something 
that needs to be explained, analyzed, disman-
tled, is also in full agreement with Darwinian 
naturalism. In asking how consciousness, ra-
ther than the unconscious, is possible, the 
cognitive scientist fully endorses Darwin’s 
methodological approach, which, assuming 
the continuity between animal and human 
minds, pursues the study of consciousness by 
virtue of a bottom-up strategy, i.e., recon-
structing how the complex psychological 
functions underlying the adult self-conscious 
mind evolve from more basic ones. 
The bottom-up approach allows us to 
draw a clear-cut distinction between object-
consciousness and self-consciousness. For da-
ta from cognitive ethology and developmen-
tal psychology provide grounds to hold that 
infants under one year of age are conscious in 
the sense that they are able to form a series of 
representations of objects and operational 
plans of action, and hence to interact with 
persons and things in flexible ways, but this 
occurs automatically, prereflexively (noncon-
ceptually), without any cognition of a bodily 
or “inner”, experiential space.23 
Few species take a step beyond this basic 
interactive monitoring of the environment. 
Great apes like chimpanzees, and in our spe-
cies infants from 15-18 months of age, can be 
said to attain awareness of their bodies as 
unitary sources of their actions and their  
gazes – as measured by the mirror self-
recognition test. But note: 15-18 months in-
fants have come to grips with the subjective-
objective space of the body but not yet with 
the virtual space of the mind. They are not 
able to objectify their own subjectivity know-
ing that it is their own subjectivity, in the 
same way as at “one and a half year of age” 
they had objectified their own body knowing 
that was their own body. For instance, three-
year-olds are not yet able to understand 
dreams as non-real, private, psychological 
occurrences; instead, they consider them as 
either real events or visions “sent from out-
side”, which crowded their bedrooms.24 
It can be supposed that at an early stage 
human bodily self-consciousness, such as that 
of the chimpanzee, is structured by a non-
conceptual representation of the physical 
self, but very soon it begins to be mediated by 
the verbal exchange with the caregiver. In 
other words, in our species the chimpanzee-
style, purely bodily self-awareness is almost 
immediately outstripped and encompassed 
by a form of descriptive self-consciousness 
that is strictly linked to linguistic tools and 
social cognition mechanisms.  
Consequently, around the age of 3 or 4 
years something occurs that can be observed 
only in the human species: the child disco-
vers that she has an “inner life”, i.e., she be-
comes able to identify and objectify her own 
subjectivity. Here the lived subjective expe-
rience takes as its object not only the outer 
world (as happens in all animals), not only 
the bodily world (as happens in chimpanzees 
and 15-18 month old children), but also itself. 
This is self-consciousness as introspective 
recognition of the presence of the virtual in-
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ner space of the mind, separated from the 
other two primary experiential spaces, viz. 
the corporeal and extracorporeal spaces; the 
consciousness as identity of person which, on 
Locke’s view, grounds the notion of respon-
sibility.25 
 
█ The Interpretive Sensory-Access theory of 
self-knowledge 
 
When this introspective consciousness is 
put under the magnifying lens of cognitive 
sciences, however, the question arises wheth-
er it is really “awareness” or rather a self-
constructive story-telling that, as Freud saw 
it, is infused with self-deceptions and bad 
faith.  
Freud’s idea of a pervasive presence of 
self-deception in our inner life has found a 
rich source of evidence in the extensive       
cognitive dissonance and causal attribution 
literatures that have built up in experimental 
social psychology over the last fifty years. In 
Nisbett and Wilson’s well-known 1977 re-
view of these literatures, the participants’ be-
havior was caused by motivational factors 
inaccessible to consciousness. However, 
when explicitly asked about the motivations 
(causes) of their actions, the subjects did not 
hesitate to sincerely affirm their plausible 
motives. Nisbett and Wilson explained this 
pattern of results by arguing that the subjects 
did not provide reports of real mental states 
and processes, due to a direct introspective 
awareness; rather they engaged in a “confa-
bulatory” activity, i.e. they used a priori caus-
al theories in order to develop reasonable but 
imaginary explanations of the motivational 
factors of their behaviors, judgments or deci-
sions.26 
Nisbett and Wilson’s account of causal 
self-attribution in terms of theory-laden con-
fabulatory activity is an exemplar of what 
Schwitzgebel termed “self/other parity ac-
count of self-knowledge”, since the attribu-
tion of psychological states to oneself is seen 
as an interpretative activity that depends on 
mechanisms that exploit theories that apply 
to the same extent to ourselves and others.27 
Such theory-driven mechanisms take as in-
put information about mind-external states 
of affairs, essentially the target’s behavior 
and/or the situation in which it occurs. 
On this perspective, then, introspection, 
insomuch as it is construed as a source of 
knowledge of the (multifactorial) aetiology 
of our judgments, decisions and behavior, is 
an illusion. In its stead we find the theory-
driven capacity to explain our judgments, de-
cisions and behavior ex post as the products 
of a rational and autonomous agent. In most 
cases of everyday life, giving reasons for what 
has been done (“being able to say why”) plays 
a justificatory  role rather than a descriptive 
one. 
It is to be noticed, however, that the 
self/other parity account is never suggested 
as an exhaustive theory of self-knowledge; for 
some margin is always left for some sort of 
direct self-knowledge.28 Nisbett and Wilson, 
e.g., draw a sharp distinction between process 
and content, i.e., between the causal processes 
underlying judgments, decisions, emotions, 
sensations and those judgments, decisions, 
emotions, sensations themselves. Subjects 
have direct access to this mental content, and 
this allows them to know it «with near cer-
tainty».29 By contrast, they have no access to 
the cognitive processes that cause behavior. 
However, insofar as the two psychologists do 
not offer any hypothesis about this alleged 
direct self-knowledge, their theory is incom-
plete. 
Peter Carruthers tried to bridge this gap 
by developing an “Interpretive Sensory-
Access” (ISA) theory of self-knowledge.30 
This theory is well in line with the global 
workspace model of the human neurocogni-
tive architecture (first postulated by Bernard 
Baars),31 which posits a range of perceptual 
systems that broadcast their outputs to a 
suite of concept-using consumer systems. 
Among these there is a mindreading system 
which, driven by a folk-psychological theo-
retical framework, produces higher-order, 
metarepresentational, beliefs about the men- 
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tal states of others and of oneself.  
The mindreading system, then, has access 
to all sensory information broadcast by our 
perceptual systems; and hence it can have a 
non-interpretive (“recognitional”) access to 
one’s own sensory and affective states. But 
the system cannot directly self-attribute 
“thoughts” (i.e., propositional-attitude 
events). For the latter are not globally broad-
cast but are the output of conceptual con-
sumer systems; and there aren’t any causal 
pathways from the outputs of these systems 
to mindreading, which would be necessary to 
allow introspective access to one’s thoughts.  
As a result, the mindreading system must 
exploit the globally broadcast perceptual in-
formation, together with some forms of 
stored knowledge, to infer the agent’s 
thoughts, precisely as it happens with the 
reading of other minds. Thus self-attribution 
of thoughts always occurs by means of a pro-
cess of self-interpretation, which rests on the 
sensory awareness of data concerning one’s 
own behavior, contextual data and/or senso-
ry items in working memory (e.g., imagery or 
sentences in inner speech). 
Carruthers offers a great number of ar-
guments for his ISA theory: considerations 
concerning the evolutionary role of min-
dreading and the literature on metacognition 
(see below); evidence from the literature on 
confabulation that allows him to apply the 
self/other parity account of self-knowledge 
to thoughts; data from psychopathology that 
refute the above-mentioned hypothesis of a 
dissociation between self-attribution and 
other-attribution. Thus he develops a sophi-
sticated version of the self/other parity ac-
count of self-knowledge in which the theory-
driven mechanisms underlying mentalistic 
self-attribution and other-attribution can 
count not only on the observation/re-
collection of one’s own behavior and/or the 
circumstances in which it occurs/occurred, 
but also on the recognition of a multitude of 
perceptual and quasi-perceptual events.  
All this delivers us a drastically debunked 
conception of our inner life. Except for per-
ceptive and quasi-perceptive events, there 
are no conscious mental phenomena; there is 
definitely no phenomenology of thought (of 
such events as judging, intending, or decid-
ing). Our inner life consists in the unfolding 
of a lush perceptive phenomenology, which 
relentlessly feeds a machinery of interpreta-
tion driven by an incomplete, partial, and in 
many cases seriously defective naïve theory 
of psychology. 
It is be noted that if this eliminative claim 
about conscious thought is well grounded, we 
have here a very strong constraint on the 
construction of a theory of moral responsibi-
lity congruent with the findings of cognitive 
sciences: the existence of conscious inten-
tional mental states cannot be among the 
theory’s commitments. Thus, to make only 
one example, let us consider the theories of 
the real self.32 These theories claim that an 
agent can be held responsible exclusively for 
those actions that have been caused by psy-
chological states reflecting its identity as 
practical agent. But if – as it seems to be ne-
cessary – the psychological states that define 
the agent’s real self are the conscious ones, 
the elimination of conscious thought implies 
the non-existence of the real self.33 
The armchair moral philosopher could 
look at this constraint with impatience, re-
butting that whereas the literatures of bio-
logical and psychological sciences are consti-
tutive of the descriptive ethics, their rele-
vance for normative ethics and meta-ethics 
appears to be much more restricted; and this 
is because these two areas of study require 
the use of a normative conceptual apparatus 
whose reducibility to naturalistic categories 
is highly controversial. But to this one can 
reply that the right acknowledgement of the 
specificity of the normative dimension 
should not go to the point of concealing its 
intimate dialectic with the descriptive sphere. 
For any moral statement is not exclusively 
prescriptive but also contains factual beliefs, 
which can be true or false.  
Therefore, the normative use of the co-
gnitive-science findings can consist in a criti-
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cal examination of the descriptive ingredient 
of our moral statements, revealing in some 
cases its close connection to conceptions of 
human nature that today we are able to un-
mask as the fruits of the imagination of phi-
losophers and theologians.34 
 
█ The defensive nature of self-consciousness 
 
Under the lens of cognitive sciences, the 
Lockean self-consciousness turned out to be 
not a direct access to inner life but a theory-
driven activity of narrative reappropriation 
of the products of the cognitive unconscious. 
Now our focus will be on the intrinsically de-
fensive nature of this self-narration. 
“Let us go back to” the ontogenesis of in-
trospective self-consciousness. With the de-
velopment of social cognition and linguistic-
narrative competence, the physical, bodily 
self-description becomes psychological, in-
trospective. And this mentalistic self-
description is likely to take shape in the act 
of turning on oneself the capacity to min-
dread other people – i.e., the understanding 
of other minds both ontogenetically precedes 
and grounds the understanding of our minds.  
As we have seen, Carruthers has made a 
strong case for the claim that third-person 
mindreading has a functional and evolution-
ary priority over first-person mindreading. 
The mindreading system can be said to be 
focused outwards on the world rather than 
inwards on the agent’s own mental states.35 
And this is what is legitimate to expect in 
light of the hypothesis that mindreading, as 
an ingredient essential to our social intelli-
gence, evolved to provide an adaptive ad-
vantage in pursuing the aims of two motiva-
tional macro-systems: the first committed to 
self-assertiveness and competition,36 the se-
cond aimed to pro-sociality and coopera-
tion.37 
In this perspective, one virtue of Car-
ruthers’ model lies in its explanatory parsi-
mony from an evolutionary point of view; for 
it posits a single phylogenetic route for both 
third person and first person mindreading. If, 
as the ISA model holds, first person min-
dreading results from turning one’s third per-
son mindreading capacities upon oneself, the 
emergence of the former will be a by-product 
of the evolution of the latter. By contrast, 
theories to the effect that first person and 
third person mindreading are subserved by 
two (or more) neurocognitive mechanisms 
bear an explanatory burden, because then 
there should plainly be a distinct evolutio-
nary story to be told about the emergence of 
each.38 And to date we do not have a plausi-
ble hypothesis about what kind of evolutio-
nary pressure can account for the emergence 
of first person mindreading mechanism(s).39 
The ISA model holds that third-person 
mindreading has a functional and evolu-
tionary priority over first-person mindread-
ing, but it does not predict that  the  former  
is developmentally prior to the latter.40 How-
ever, there are good reasons for thinking that 
the inner experiential space is constructed 
outward-in; and  that  this  occurs  around 
the age of 3-4 years and in an interpersonal 
context, viz. in the relationship with the 
caregiver. 
More precisely, it can be supposed that 
one of the factors that give rise to inner life is 
a component of the mindreading system that 
systematically reads behaviors of other peo-
ple as actions driven by goals, purposes, in-
tentions (and intentions with a positive or 
negative valence).41 The question “What 
does that want to do?” (where “that” can re-
fer to the mother or the home cat) is already 
asked in infancy and toddlerhood. And then, 
on the basis of this kind of questions, chil-
dren begin to ask also what their own inten-
tions are, what their own inner state is. This 
appropriation of themes that initially were 
only connected to the reading of others’ be-
haviors is mediated mainly by a learning that 
is educational, and hence cultural.  
In other words, it can be supposed that a 
large part of simplest introspections are 
forms of learning emerging from the verbal 
stereotypes and rhetorics through which 
adults rename the intentions of others. A two 
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year old, maybe because she is scared by her 
granny’s cat, maybe as an act of defiance, 
gives the cat a boot; and here are the recon-
structive judgements about this episode on 
the part of the adults, which she is invited to 
internalize: “Bad child! It didn’t mean to 
claw you at all!”, or “It had scared you, but 
perhaps that kitty was more scared than 
you”. And so the child gradually learns – and 
always internalizing the (hypothetical) names 
that the adults give to her inner states – that 
inside her there are scares, badness, and so 
on. She understands that these are contin-
gent social expressions, part of social media-
tions, but also grasps what “information 
about herself” means.42 
Note the connection between the con-
struction of inner life and ethics, to which 
Locke had already drawn attention. Morality 
reinvents inner life from scratch: being bad 
and being good, having bad intentions and 
having good intentions, appear to the child 
the premise of imputability even before of 
responsibility. This permits to explain why, 
despite the above-mentioned verbal stereo-
types and rhetorics actually contain a plea for 
responsibility, in our culture the sense of re-
sponsible appropriation of one’s own actions 
– so I know that I could be objectively and 
legally responsible for a car accident even if I 
could not be able to identify in myself an in-
tention to cause it43 – is usually replaced by a 
more unclear and sterile feeling, the sense of 
guilt.  
For the sense of guilt can be ascribed pre-
cisely to that instinctive-primitive interpreta-
tion of human actions, which always and 
necessarily links them to an aware inten-
tionality, good or bad, and makes it difficult 
to accept and understand the presence of in-
voluntary, fortuitous, inattentive or unaware 
behaviors. That an action can be an offence 
irrespective of good or bad intents is not ta-
ken into account by our intuitive psychology. 
Introspective self-consciousness arises 
therefore in the child in a relationship with 
the caregiver that is made of words, descrip-
tions, designations, evaluations of the person. 
Through the dialogue with the caregiver 
(and then with other social partners) the 3-4-
year-old child builds itself by constructing its 
own identity, both objective (i.e., for others) 
and subjective (i.e., for itself). And following 
G.H. Mead’s lesson, we can say that the iden-
tity-for-itself largely derives from the identi-
ty-for-others; namely, we see ourselves, and 
define ourselves, essentially introjecting the 
way in which others see and define us.  
The child’s inner experiential space gra-
dually takes the form of subjective identity – 
i.e., the child gradually comes to experience 
himself as a person, to define himself as a cer-
tain kind of person, and to trace his own con-
tinuous identity as a person across time and 
space. This is a complex cognitive achieve-
ment, which is the establishment of an auto-
biographical memory system.  
Children are required to achieve the ca-
pacity to perceive their identity as situated in 
memory: i.e., they must be able to represent 
not only the “what”, “where”, and “when” of 
a past event, but also themselves as the sub-
jects who experienced that event. This per-
ception of an identity situated in memory 
will be progressively rationalized in terms of 
autobiography. This is “narrative identity”, 
i.e., a structure that can provide the jumble of 
autobiographical memories «with some 
semblance of unity, purpose, and mean-
ing».44 Research findings show that the com-
plexity and coherence of this structure in-
crease across adolescence until early adult-
hood.45 
In this process of narrative self-
construction there is an essential psychody-
namic component. Dynamic psychology tells 
us that the affective growth and the construc-
tion of identity cannot be separated; the de-
scription of the self that since 2-3 years of age 
the child feverishly pursues is an “accepting 
description”, i.e., a description that is indis-
solubly cognitive (as definition of self) and 
emotional-affective (as acceptance of self). In 
brief, the child needs a clear and consistent 
capacity to describe itself, fully legitimized by 
the caregiver and socially valid. On the other 
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hand, this will continue to hold during the 
entire cycle of life: the construction of affec-
tive life will always be intimately connected 
to the construction of a well-defined and in-
terpersonally valid identity.46 
Accordingly, one cannot ascribe con-
creteness and solidity to one’s own self-
consciousness if the latter does not possess as 
a center a description of identity that must be 
clear and, indissolubly, “good” as worthy of 
being loved. Our mental balance rests on this 
feeling of solidly existing as an “I”. If the self-
description becomes uncertain, the subject 
soon feels that the feeling of existing vani-
shes. This can be the result of some psycho-
pathological process; and indeed, clinical re-
search shows that if the coherence of the rep-
resentation of self is invalidated, or made in-
ternally contradictory, then also the primary 
feeling of self enters into crisis.  
Let us consider, e.g., the case of all those 
patients whose main problem is a chronic 
feeling of insecurity (or lack of self-esteem, 
confidence in oneself, solidity of the ego,   
cohesion of the self – terms that I take to be 
essentially synonymous). According to a tra-
dition that begins with Michael Balint,   
Donald Winnicott and John Bowlby, the 
origin of this “basic fault” is to be traced back 
mainly to early deficiencies in the relation-
ship between the child and the primary at-
tachment figure.47 This chronic feeling of in-
security dramatically arises, e.g., in patients 
with narcissistic personality disorders. A 
share of narcissistic defenses is normal in the 
construction of one’s identity; pathology 
comes into play when the subject exploits 
narcissism to compensate for a condition of 
insecurity and insufficient self-esteem.  
The theme was explored in depth by 
Heinz Kohut.48 A narcissistic defense consists 
not only in the more or less anxious safe-
guard of the image that we want to have of 
ourselves, but also in a certain kind of rela-
tionship with external world; in this case we 
talk about an object relation of narcissistic 
type, viz. a link with situations, things or per-
sons that serve as symbols that help to reas-
sure ourselves about one’s identity. In some 
cases the feeling of identity is so precarious 
(the self is so little “cohesive”, Kohut would 
say) that the patient finds it difficult to feel 
existent and is afraid to completely losing 
contact with himself or herself if deprived of 
such reassurances.49 
A  collapse   of   the   existential  feeling  of 
presence, however, may also occur in cases of 
sudden breakdown of self-esteem, or unex-
pected emotional upheavals, or when the 
continuity of the tissue of our sociality is 
broken, as can happen when one is suddenly 
thrown in some dehumanizing total institu-
tion.50 In such circumstances the subject 
strives to cling to her memories, or to the 
sense of a projectual dignity, or to the secret 
security of an affiliation:  
 
but if all these fail us, then we realize that 
our mind becomes empty, and not only 
we no longer know who we are, but also 
we literally lose the feeling of being pre-
sent.51 
 
█ Narrative identity, responsibility, guilt 
 
To recapitulate, introspective self-
consciousness is an activity of narrative re-
appropriation of the products of the uncon-
scious information-processing machinery, 
and this activity has an essentially self-
defensive character, being ruled by our pri-
mary and universal need to construct and 
protect a subjective identity whose cohesive-
ness is the ground of our intra- and inter-
personal balances. 
But we have to be very clear about one 
point. When we use cognitive sciences as a 
source of tools to set up a critique of self-
conscious subjectivity, and when we empha-
size the defensive nature of self-con-
sciousness as narrative identity, our polestar 
is a tradition of critical thought that refers to 
Freud’s concept of rationalization. And then 
it is true that Freud taught us that the         
description/narration of our inner life gets 
organized on the basis of a self-apologetic  
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defensiveness, and hence it is a construction 
permeated  by  myths  and  interested self-
deceptions. But to this claim the great   
thinker always associated the firm belief that 
this self-image can be at least partially “de-
mystified”, thus acknowledging the possibil-
ity of a path of genuine self-knowledge. 
Therefore, unlike those trends of thought 
that cultivate a radically conventionalist view 
of knowing, the tradition to which Freud be-
longs draws a clear-cut line of demarcation 
between the historical truth and the narrative 
one.52 
In this framework, the already mentioned 
contrast between guilt and responsibility gets 
a new meaning. Locke was definitely right in 
defining responsibility as the capacity of crit-
ically re-appropriating one’s own acts, pro-
jects, memories. But once we have rejected 
the Lockean theory of inner sense and en-
dorsed an interpretativist view of introspec-
tive self-consciousness, the re-appropriation 
can be defined as “critical” only in the sense 
of being a self-narration that is more “hon-
est” (less imbued with “bad faith”) than that 
we usually practice. In other words, the criti-
cal, or rather responsible, re-appropriation of 
one’s own actions and mentations (and more 
in general of one’s own life events) consists in 
a process of self-knowledge that goes beyond 
(and against) the mechanisms of self-
deception underlying self-conscious subjec-
tivity.  
This is not how things stand for someone 
who suffers from a sense of guilt: for in this 
case the subject deceives himself by treating 
what he feels guilty about extraneous to him-
self; in short, he expels it from his self-nar-
ration.  
Let us go back to the driver who, after 
running over the poor pedestrian, is afflicted 
by a tormenting sense of guilt and longs for 
absolution. In his feeling guilty he represents 
to himself that event as an extraneous body, 
perceives it as a discontinuity in the flux of 
his life – in the psychoanalytic idiom, he 
“evacuates” it. By contrast, if that individual 
will admit the fact that, say, he is a person 
whose overbearing and aggressive character 
reverberates in his way of driving, as well as 
the fact that when he ran over the pedestrian 
he was driving too fast, then he takes a path 
toward a  responsible  appropriation of the 
fatal event that dispels its egodystonic char-
acter. And thus, whereas the sense of guilt is 
the outcome of a self-narration permeated by 
bad faith, the assumption of responsibility is 
the result of a path of self-knowledge that fi-
nally permits him to include in his own life 
story also  the  crimes  or  misdemeanors  that 
he has committed.53 
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